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1. Introduction 
Over the course of more than seven decades, treaty norms on the production and utilisation of 
nuclear energy have been developed, which together form a special section within international 
law. These norms are the consequence of the unique nature of the field, namely that on the one 
hand some aspects of the uses of nuclear energy should be covered by totally new and special 
norms (e.g. in the field of disarmament, seeking to eliminate or at least to control the spread of 
nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons tests) and on the other that several traditional legal 
solutions were not suitable for the problems that emerged in connection with other uses of 
nuclear energy (like liability). 
In the following article, three aspects of the development of that special section of international 
law will be explored, namely: the close connections between the regulation of peaceful and 
military uses of nuclear energy; the effects of nuclear catastrophes on the development of 
international nuclear legislation and the interaction between soft law norms and binding norms in 
the area of nuclear law. 
2. Two-tier approach in nuclear energy regulation 
Since atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II (on 6 
and 9 August 1945),
1
 nuclear disarmament has been a primary concern for humankind. Several 
nuclear disarmament treaties have been signed in the 70 or so years that have elapsed since then,
2
 
yet the complete elimination of nuclear weapons remains a distant goal. This was acknowledged 
by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion on the “Legality of the threat or use 
of nuclear weapons”, when it stated that “There is in neither customary nor conventional 
international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear 
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 The bombings caused the death of over 130 000 people in the space of a few seconds, and many others were killed by radiation. 
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 The most important are the:  
 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Test in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963), 480 UNTS 43, entered into 
force 10 October 1963;  
 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/140, 729 UNTS 169, entered into force 5 
March 1970 (NPT);  
 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996) (not yet entered into force), available at: 
www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/treaty/treaty_text.pdf (Nuclear Test Ban Treaty);  
 Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures 
with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (1972), entered into force 3 October 1972 (SALT I);  
 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms, Together with Agreed Statements and Common Understandings regarding the Treaty (1979), did not enter 
into force (SALT II);  
 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics on Further Reduction and Limitation 
of Strategic Offensive Arms (1991), entered into force 5 December 1994 (START I);  
 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms (1993) (not yet entered into force) (START II); and  
 nuclear weapons free zone treaties. 
weapons as such”.3 With respect to the use of nuclear weapons in an armed conflict, the Court 
ruled “[b]y seven votes to seven, by the President’s casting vote,” that “However, in view of the 
current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot 
conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful 
in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at 
stake”.4 
Nuclear weapons cast a shadow over opportunities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and 
their regulations are very often grouped together. This two-tier approach is a feature of national 
and international legislation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and of the activities of 
international organisations that oversee this area. In this respect, Pierre Strohl, referring to 
domestic law provisions and to international law on the use of nuclear energy states that nuclear 
law essentially has the purpose of addressing a specific hazard and takes its originality from that 
purpose.
5
 The close links between regulations on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the 
prevention of its destructive use arise out of its dual nature, since in technical terms, peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy can be diverted for military purposes.  
The Atomic Energy Commission is an example of the close links referred to above. This body 
was established after the Second World War by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 
1946 with a mandate to present specific proposals on the control of atomic energy to ensure its 
application exclusively for peaceful purposes, and on the exclusion of any national use of an 
atomic weapon or any other weapon of mass destruction.
6
 This two-tier approach is also 
characteristic of the activities of other international nuclear organisations. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in 1957 to encourage and facilitate 
the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes throughout the world as well as 
research into this field, is also responsible for introducing and applying safeguards to ensure “that 
assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a 
way as to further any military purpose”.7 The application of the IAEA safeguards was broadened 
considerably by Article III of the NPT, which provides for the Agency’s safeguards to be applied 
in non-nuclear-weapon states parties.
8
 The Agency thus ensures that material, facilities and 
technology in such states are used for peaceful purposes and are not diverted for military use. 
Through the NPT, the Agency has become the leading verification body for the commitments 
arising out of one of the most important disarmament treaties of modern times. In the event of a 
state’s failure to respect the safeguards, the IAEA, or more precisely its Board of Governors, can 
and must refer the matter to the Security Council, the primary UN body with particular 
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responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and to the UN General Assembly 
for decisions to be taken on sanctions against a state that does not respect its obligations under the 
NPT.
9
 
Security control systems are also found under the auspices of other international nuclear 
organisations. The predecessor of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), the European Nuclear Energy Agency 
(ENEA), established in 1957 to further the development of the production and uses of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes, initially operated a security control mechanism that sought to 
“ensure that the operation of joint undertakings established by two or more Governments … on 
the initiative or with the assistance of the Agency and [that] materials, equipment and services 
made available by the Agency or under its supervision … shall not further any military 
purpose”.10 Subsequently, with the creation of similar systems by other international nuclear 
organisations (IAEA and Euratom), the application of the ENEA’s security control system was 
suspended.
11
 Euratom, the main objective of which is to favour the development of nuclear 
energy, has had a safeguards system since 1957, and according to Article 77 of the Euratom 
Treaty,
12
 Euratom safeguards must ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted to the possible 
production of nuclear weapons. In 1973, Euratom non-nuclear-weapon member states and the 
European Commission (EC) entered into an agreement with the IAEA on the application of 
safeguards under the NPT, and according to that agreement, Euratom, as a regional body, 
contributes to the implementation of the IAEA safeguarding system.
13
 
The two-tier approach referred to above is also found in the NPT. It is well known that the latter 
distinguishes nuclear-weapon states from non-nuclear-weapon states.
14
 In this Treaty, nuclear-
weapon states undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or to assist any non-nuclear-weapon 
state to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons 
or explosive devices, while non-nuclear weapon states undertake not to receive the transfer of and 
not to manufacture nuclear weapons and thus decline to acquire them.
15
 
The NPT, however, also contains a clause (Article IV) on the use of nuclear energy that 
recognises the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and 
uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This clause highlights the commitment of states to 
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facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological 
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
16
 
The close links between the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons non-
proliferation in regulations concerning nuclear exports are evident. Since 1974, the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG),
17
 an international collection of countries supplying nuclear material, 
equipment and technologies, has drawn up guidelines on nuclear trade for peaceful purposes to 
ensure that such trade does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
18
 
Links between disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy are evident in the treaties 
establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.
19
 The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 
Latin America and the Caribbean
20
 thus provides not only for a prohibition on the testing, use, 
manufacture, production or acquisition of any nuclear weapons or participation in such activities, 
and on the storage, deployment or possession of nuclear weapons, but also states that nuclear 
material and facilities should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Similarly, the Agency 
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Organismo para la 
Proscription de las Armas Nucleares en la America Latina) (OPANAL), created to ensure respect 
for the provisions of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, “has never forgotten that its major future task is to 
promote access to nuclear technology for exclusively peaceful purposes”.21 It should be added 
that the other treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones also refer to the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy. 
3. The influence of experience of nuclear accidents on international nuclear legislation 
The nuclear accidents that have occurred in recent times have highlighted not only the technical 
shortcomings but also the gaps and incoherence in legal regulations on the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy and have shown how important it is to have clear and effective rules at both 
national and international level. 
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The first major accident in a nuclear power plant occurred on 28 March 1979 at the Three Mile 
Island facility near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in the United States.
22
 Despite the extremely serious 
nature of the accident, which released a rather small amount of radioactive material into the 
environment, there were no victims among personnel or the population.
23
 The event, however, led 
to changes in and helped to strengthen safety rules. 
The most serious nuclear accident, at Chernobyl in the former Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) on 26 April 1986, was classified at the highest level, 7, on the INES scale. 
This catastrophe “was in fact a wake-up call for the ‘international nuclear community’”24 and 
clearly demonstrated the gravity of a major accident and its consequences for human health and 
the natural environment. It also led to the realisation that a nuclear accident could cause huge 
damage not only in the installation state but also thousands of kilometres away. From a legal 
point of view, the Chernobyl tragedy helped to: (i) strengthen and broaden international 
co-operation in the case of a nuclear accidents; (ii) ensure the adoption of international 
conventions in areas that had previously been regulated by soft law standards; and (iii) bring 
international conventions on civil liability for nuclear damage up to date.
25
 
The first lesson of the catastrophe was that inter-state co-operation had to be increased and 
facilitated in cases of nuclear accidents where one of the states was affected by an urgent 
situation with radioactive consequences. Two conventions were accordingly drafted some months 
after the accident within the framework of the IAEA: the Convention on Early Notification of a 
Nuclear Accident
26
 and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident.
27
 These 
two treaties were drawn up and entered into force very quickly and became effective just a few 
months after the Chernobyl accident.
28
 
The Early Notification Convention, which entered into force just one month after its adoption, 
seeks to strengthen international co-operation. The states parties to this Convention undertake to 
notify, directly or through the IAEA, states that are or may be physically affected, and provide 
them with information as soon as possible on any event occurring on their territory that has 
resulted or may result in an international transboundary release that could be of radiological 
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safety significance for another state. Similarly, the Assistance Convention seeks to facilitate 
co-operation between states in the event of a radiological emergency to minimise its 
consequences and to protect life, property and the environment from the effects of radioactive 
releases. 
A very important instrument for areas that were previously not regulated by the treaties was the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety,
29
 adopted in 1994 under IAEA auspices. The aim of the CNS is 
“to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety” in land-based civil nuclear power plants, 
“to establish and maintain effective defences in nuclear installations against potential radiological 
hazards in order to protect individuals, society and the environment”, and “to prevent accidents 
with radiological consequences and to mitigate such consequences should they occur”.30 As noted 
in the Preamble, the CNS has its roots in the fundamental safety principles (at the time contained 
in The Safety of Nuclear Installations of 1993
31
, but now addressed in the 2006 Fundamental 
Safety Principles
32
). Under the Convention, each contracting party must submit reports on the 
implementation of their obligations under the Convention for peer review at periodic meetings.
33
 
The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management
34
 was adopted in 1997 and complements the CNS. One of the characteristics 
of this Convention is that it brings two separate subjects together within a “joint” framework: the 
safety of spent fuel and the safety of radioactive waste management. The objective of the Joint 
Convention is “to achieve and maintain a high level of safety [] in spent fuel and radioactive 
waste management, . . . so that individuals, society and the environment are protected from 
harmful effects of ionizing radiation”. The obligations of the contracting parties fall into two 
main types.
35
 The first is based on provisions of the CNS and on IAEA Safety Standards Series, 
while the second requires the contracting parties to draw up regular reports on the 
implementation of these obligations, which are submitted to a question and answer session and 
then peer reviewed at meetings of the contracting parties, similar to that which is done for the 
CNS. 
With regard to the importance of the two conventions referred to above, Selma Kuş correctly 
pointed out that Chernobyl “facilitated international co-operation in fields that were until then 
strictly protected by individual states as falling under their sovereign jurisdiction”.36 It became 
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apparent after Chernobyl that the treaty on compensation for cross-border damage, the Vienna 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage,
37
 adopted in 1963 under IAEA auspices, 
could represent an appropriate instrument for settling compensation claims brought by foreign 
victims in similar situations. An urgent need then arose to adapt the Vienna Convention’s 
provisions to take account of the technological progress made over the 25 years that had elapsed. 
After the Chernobyl accident, the then Soviet Union refused to pay compensation to the foreign 
victims. Some observers felt that if the Soviet Union had been bound by the Vienna Convention, 
foreign victims would at least have had a chance to receive damages. Their compensation, 
however, posed a problem: the amount finally payable under the 1963 Vienna Convention would 
have made it possible to satisfy only a ridiculously minimal proportion of the claims for 
compensation in light of the scale of the accident.
38
 
Yet even if victims in Western Europe or Scandinavia were to suffer nuclear damage, they would 
not be entitled to claim compensation from the former USSR or from the Soviet operator, since 
rather than being contracting parties to the Vienna Convention, these states were actually parties 
to another convention, the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy.
 39
 There was therefore no link between the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention. 
The contracting parties to the Vienna Convention were states that were not parties to the Paris 
Convention and vice versa, and the conventions did not apply to damage suffered on the territory 
of a state that was a contracting party to the other convention. 
To resolve this issue, subsequent to the Chernobyl catastrophe, in 1988 the contracting parties to 
the two nuclear liability conventions adopted the Joint Protocol,
40
 which established a “bridge” 
between the two conventions for compensation for cross-border damage.
41
 Since the entry into 
force of the Joint Protocol in 1992, victims from states that are parties to the Paris Convention or 
the Vienna Convention have been entitled to compensation for such damage from the operator of 
a nuclear facility in the territory where the other convention applies. 
The consequences of Chernobyl have illustrated the inadequacies of the nuclear liability 
conventions. Negotiations to revise the Vienna Convention began in 1989, and the contracting 
parties to the Paris Convention followed suit several years later.
42
 The results of these efforts 
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were the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention
43
 on the one hand,
44
 and the Protocol to 
Amend the Paris Convention
45
 and the Protocol to Amend the Brussels Supplementary 
Convention
46
 on the other (the latter two protocols have yet to enter into force).
47
 These 
amendments broadened the geographic scope of the conventions and expanded the notion of 
nuclear damage so that its definition included certain forms of damage to the environment, the 
costs of preventive measures and “economic loss”. They also set out more stringent criteria for 
exonerating the operator and increased the amount of damages
48
 and the limitation period for 
claims, which was raised to 30 years in the case of loss of life or personal injury. 
In the negotiations on the revision of the Vienna Convention, in parallel to its amendment, a new 
treaty was adopted: the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.
49
 This 
instrument seeks to establish a worldwide liability regime and to make public funds available that 
establish an amount to supplement those made available by the existing systems as compensation 
for nuclear damage.
50
 
The third nuclear catastrophe occurred on 11 March 2011 at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power plant in Japan. This was caused by a huge tsunami following an earthquake measuring 8.9 
on the Richter scale, the epicentre of which was located in the Pacific Ocean 145 km from 
Fukushima. This accident was also classified at level 7 on the INES scale. Over 100 000 people 
were subsequently evacuated because of radionuclide discharges into the environment, though 
the tragedy did not cause significant damage on the territory of foreign states. 
Measures were taken worldwide after Fukushima to assess the safety of nuclear facilities in light 
of the lessons learnt from the accident, which “brought nuclear safety to the forefront of global 
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attention”.51 The nuclear countries and international organisations commissioned supplementary 
safety studies on nuclear installations,
52
 and on 25 March 2011, the EC took a decision to verify 
the safety of 143 European nuclear power plants and carry out global assessments of the 
respective risks and of the security of such plants (“stress tests”).53 In addition, a 2014 Directive 
on nuclear safety stressed the independence of the competent regulatory authority in its 
regulatory decision-making, stating that it was a fundamental requirement of the Community 
nuclear safety regulatory framework, and underscored the importance of enhancing transparency 
on nuclear safety matters.
54
 
In legal terms, the events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant demonstrated not only 
the importance of the CNS and the mechanism established by that international instrument, but 
also led the EU to study opportunities for improving and strengthening nuclear liability 
schemes.
55
 This was because the events in Japan also raised the question of whether nuclear 
power plant operators and the authorities of states with nuclear power plants were sufficiently 
prepared to respond to a serious nuclear accident. Subsequent to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, 
the Japanese Government introduced a range of measures to adapt the nuclear damage 
compensation scheme to the situation that had arisen, and the Japanese authorities established a 
special scheme for compensating victims of the accident.
56
 
4. Interaction between soft law norms and binding norms in the area of nuclear law 
Soft law norms or “advisory regulations” play a very important role in the area of the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy,
57
 as the legal scheme governing peaceful uses of nuclear energy are 
grounded in a mix of binding norms and advisory regulations.
58
 The advisory regulations appear 
in the form of codes of conduct, recommendations or guidelines, etc. drawn up by expert groups 
of international nuclear organisations, particularly the IAEA, Euratom and the NEA, and 
subsequently approved by the governing bodies of those organisations.
59
 These norms provide the 
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international source for implementing national regulations by ensuring a level of uniformity, 
professionalism and accuracy. 
Nowadays, these international organisations are producing an increasing number of technical 
guidelines and recommendations, and as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled, in 
interpreting an agreement between the parties in the Pulp mills on the River Uruguay case (the 
“1975 Statute”60), the guidelines and recommendations of international technical bodies, while 
“not being formally binding, are, to the extent they are relevant, to be taken into account by the 
State so that the domestic rules and regulations and the measures it adopts are compatible (‘con 
adecuación’) with those guidelines and recommendations”.61 Thus according to the ICJ, despite 
their lack of binding force, these rules are of great practical importance.  
The importance of soft law norms in nuclear law is reinforced by the fact that IAEA Safety 
Standards (the Safety Fundamentals, Safety Requirements and Safety Giudes) represent a 
minimum internationally acceptable standards of safety. Failure to adhere to these norms is 
regarded as a failure to fulfil the customary obligation of due diligence.
62
 In international nuclear 
law, several soft law norms have been converted over the years into treaty-based sources of 
international law, a trend that not only continued but intensified after the Chernobyl accident.
63
 
The first stage of this process was the adoption of the Conventions referred to above on Early 
Notification and Assistance, both of which were founded on existing non-legally binding 
guidelines.
64
  
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
65
 is a primary example of 
interaction between advisory regulations and treaty-based norms. The physical protection of 
nuclear material focuses mainly on physical protection against the theft or illegal use of nuclear 
material that could be used to produce a nuclear explosive device.
66
 This physical protection was 
therefore a matter of constant concern to the international community. In order to avoid such 
occurrences, soft law norms drafted by the IAEA had existed since the 1970s, particularly on the 
physical protection of nuclear material during transport, when such material is particularly 
vulnerable to the risk of diversion and use for illegal purposes. The CPPNM was adopted in 1980 
on the basis of non-binding norms and provided for the physical protection of nuclear material 
during international transport, the penalisation of offences and international co-operation.  
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In 2005, the CPPNM was amended by the contracting parties.
67
 They significantly extended the 
scope of the Convention, since the instrument concerned the physical protection not only of 
nuclear material but also of nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes against theft or any other 
unlawful taking of such material, acts of sabotage or terrorism. The title of the instrument 
accordingly changed to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and 
Nuclear Facilities (CPPNMNF).
68
 The CPPNMNF also includes references to the soft law norms, 
since a new Article 2A provides for a number of “Fundamental Principles” of physical protection 
of nuclear material and facilities. The codification of advisory regulations in the CPPNM does 
not mean, however, that the soft law norms become less important. Rather, it is the combination 
of the CPPNM and its Amendment, along with the IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations on 
the protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities
69
 that comprise the international physical 
protection regime.
70
 
Both the CNS and the Joint Convention have a soft law basis. One of the characteristics of these 
two instruments is that they are classified in their preambles as “incentive conventions”. The 
preamble to the CNS states that the instrument “entails a commitment to the application of 
fundamental safety principles for nuclear installations rather than of detailed safety standards and 
that there are internationally formulated safety guidelines which are updated from time to time 
and so can provide guidance on contemporary means of achieving a high level of safety”.71 The 
second part of the above text clearly alludes to the soft law codes and guidelines drafted by the 
international nuclear organisations. The Joint Convention is more specific in this respect than the 
CNS, given that its preamble lists certain soft law standards: “[k]eeping in mind the principles 
contained in the interagency ‘International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing 
Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources’ (1996), in the IAEA Safety Fundamentals 
entitled ‘The Principles of Radioactive Waste Management’ (1995), and in the existing 
international standards relating to the safety of the transport of radioactive materials”.72 
The incentive nature of the nuclear safety conventions has drawn criticism that they may create 
expectations rather than specific obligations.
73
 According to Menno Kaminga, the greatest 
weakness of the CNS is that it provides for courses of action rather than obligations to expect 
specific results.
74
 Another commentator, Norbert Pelzer, on the other hand stresses the incentive 
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nature of the nuclear safety conventions as one of their advantages, considering them to be more 
respectful of the sovereignty of states and consequently more acceptable.
75
 
The reference to soft law norms in the conventions certainly does not change the legal status of 
those standards, but it has increased their importance, which also demonstrates how the two types 
of norms can interact in complex areas.
76
 It should be added that this trend is not entirely new, 
and according to Günther Handl it exemplifies an ongoing wider trend in the design of 
multilateral (environmental or equivalent) agreements “that has increasingly de-emphasised 
coercive application/enforcement measures for the sake of a facilitative, co-operative 
approach”.77 
There is no doubt that reference in the international conventions to the application of non-binding 
standards drafted by the international nuclear organisations demonstrates a certain flexibility in 
the system, as well as an adaptation to the demands of different states and to the development of 
nuclear science and technology without the need for a lengthy process of amending the 
conventions. The question nevertheless arises of whether the time has come to introduce binding 
standards into the nuclear safety conventions, especially when the standards in question are not 
technical and in particular bearing in mind that, over the past 20 years, nuclear safety culture (to 
use the terminology of the nuclear safety conventions)
78
 has expanded throughout the world. 
In taking account of the lessons of the Fukushima accident, it should be noted that a Diplomatic 
Conference to revise the CNS was convened in 2015 with the specific aim of reinforcing the 
CNS. The conference agenda included a Swiss proposal to introduce a new subparagraph into 
Article 18 of the Convention to improve the safety of future nuclear power plants and of existing 
power plants as far as possible. Regrettably, however, the amendment to the Convention was 
rejected, and rather than drafting binding norms, a declaration entitled the “Vienna Declaration 
on Nuclear Safety: On principles for the implementation of the objective of the Convention on 
Nuclear Safety to prevent accidents and mitigate radiological consequences”79 was adopted by 
consensus, and this is yet again a non-binding instrument.
80
 It would thus seem that the 
possibility of adopting non-binding rather than binding standards does not always help to 
improve nuclear safety, as illustrated here. 
5. Conclusion 
Since the beginning, efforts to eliminate or regulate the military uses of nuclear energy went 
hand-in-hand with the promotion of the peaceful uses. This demonstrates the responsibility and 
awareness of the international community of states, namely, that the prohibition and elimination 
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of military uses of nuclear energy should not hamper its peaceful application, and also, on the 
other side of the coin, while promoting the peaceful application of nuclear energy, the diversion 
of peaceful applications of nuclear energy to military uses should be prevented. This duality has 
been reflected in several international instruments and in the activities of international 
organisations as well, and can be considered a special attribute of international nuclear law. 
The impact of nuclear accidents on the development of international nuclear instruments is 
another special feature of international nuclear law. The scale and effects of catastrophic nuclear 
accidents are past all belief and have highlighted not only the technical shortcomings but also the 
gaps and incoherence in the legal framework for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The new 
instruments adopted following the Chernobyl accident, as well as the amendments to existing 
conventions, strengthened and broadened the framework for international co-operation in the 
nuclear field, improved the position of potential victims of nuclear accidents, and increased the 
safety, security and physical protection of nuclear materials and installations. Nevertheless, these 
issues should be the subject of further consideration and all efforts and initiatives aimed at 
clarifying and detailing the content of the above-mentioned norms, as well as efforts to monitor 
their compliance, should be promoted and supported. 
The interaction between soft law norms and treaty law is the last special aspect of the 
development of nuclear law, and one can see two trends. On the one hand, several soft law norms 
have been converted into treaty norms; and on the other hand, soft law norms, especially 
international standards and regulations, are referenced in international conventions. No doubt, the 
approach of using non-binding norms has great advantages, in view of their flexibility and the 
quick adoption in the development of science and technology. But, the preffered approach would 
be to introduce binding standards into, for example, the nuclear safety conventions, especially 
when the standards in question are not technical. 
 
